1 a considered appreciation of the evolved nature of human psychology. Such a framework would then be enriched in different ways to meet the particular needs of each discipline.
In a summary to be amplified below, we may characterize the economic model as rational choice theory, which takes the individual as maximizing a self-regarding preference ordering subject to an unanalyzed and pre-given set of beliefs, called subjective priors. The sociological model is that of the pliant individual who internalizes the norms and values of society and behaves according to the dictates of the social roles he occupies. The biological model is that of the fitness maximizer who is the product of a long process of Darwinian evolution. Each of these models is deeply insightful but equally deeply one-sided and flawed. The analysis presented here, which is a development of the extended argument in Gintis (2009a) , shows a way forward in conserving the major insights of these three models while rejecting their weakness-weaknesses that account for their mutual incompatibility.
This framework for unification includes five conceptual units: (a) gene-culture coevolution; (b) the socio-psychological theory of norms; (c) game theory, (d) the rational actor model; and (e) complexity theory. Gene-culture coevolution comes from the biological theory of social organization (sociobiology), and is foundational because Homo sapiens is an evolved, biological, highly social, species. The socio-psychological theory of norms includes fundamental insights from sociology that apply to all forms of human social organization, from hunter-gatherer to advanced technological societies.
The role of these five principles (and others that might emerge along side or replacing them as the process of unification progresses) is to render models of human behavior from different disciplines compatible where they overlap. Of course, unification will not and should not collapse all disciplines into one, or cause some disciplines to become subdisciplines of others. The behavioral disciplines will and should retain their constitutive explanatory goals. Rather, the above five principles, supplemented by additional perspectives, will ensure that where the objects of inquiry in distinct disciplines coincide, the explanations from the various disciplines are concordant (Palfrey and Levine 2007, Palfrey et al. 2007 ).
Complexity theory is relevant because human society has emergent properties that cannot be derived analytically from lower-level constructs. This is why agentbased modeling (Sun 2006 (Sun , 2008 as well as historical and ethnographic studies of human social dynamics (Geertz 1963 ) are needed to supplement analytical and agent-based models (see Ron Sun's chapter in this volume).
For the sake of clarity, we note that the emergent properties of a complex system are not caused by its higher-level structure. Rather the lower-level causes of emergent properties are too complex to be analytically modeled. For instance, water is "caused" by its constituents (hydrogen, oxygen, and their pair-bonds), but the causation is so complex that we cannot predict some of the most important properties of water by simply solving the Schrödinger equation with the appropriate potential function. Similarly, a digital computer has emergent properties with respect to its solid-state and electronic components, in the sense that we must develop wholly novel ideas, including the concepts of hardware, software, memory, and algorithms, to understand the computer, rather than explaining its operation in terms of the laws of quantum mechanics.
Human cognition is an emergent property of human evolution because the emergence of language entailed a transformation if individual cognition into social cognition, in which cognitive processes are distributed across brains and between brains and material cognitive tools (Dunbar et al. 2010) . For this reason, human cognition cannot be completely understood by studying individual brains in social isolation. Similarly, human morality and ethics, including the role of social norms in regulating human behavior, cannot be understood by investigating the content and operation of individual brains: morality is a distributed social cognition.
Game theory includes three branches related to cognitive psychology: behavioral, epistemic, and evolutionary game theory. Behavioral game theory, which uses classical game-theoretic methodology to reveal and quantify the social psychology of human strategic interaction, reveals that rational behavior involves deep structural psychological principles, including other-regarding preferences and the human propensity to value virtuous behavior for its own sake. Don Ross's chapter in this volume explains the cognitive basis of behavioral game theory and its relationship to neuroeconomics. Epistemic game theory is the application of the modal logic of knowledge and belief to strategic interaction, and fosters the integration of the rational actor model with the socio-psychological theory of norms (Gintis 2009a) . Epistemic game theory reveals dimensions of cognitive processes that are key to understanding human cooperation, but are obscured in classical game theory, which equates rationality with "maximization." The cognitive foundations of epistemic are game theory, which deals with the epistemological structure of knowledge and belief, increasingly revealed in neuroscientific studies, which reveal how the brain represents other agents during game-theoretic interactions (Hampton et al. 2006 (Hampton et al. , 2008 . Finally, evolutionary game theory is a macro-level analytical apparatus allowing the insights of biological and cultural evolution to be analytically modeled. . The rational actor model is the single most important analytical construct in 4 the behavioral sciences operating at the level of the individual. While gene-culture coevolutionary theory is a form of "ultimate" explanation that does not predict, the rational actor model provides a "proximate" description of behavior that can be tested in the laboratory and real life, and is the basis of the explanatory success of economic theory. Game theory makes no sense without the rational actor model, and behavioral disciplines, like sociology and psychology, that have abandoned this model have fallen into theoretical disarray. Cognitive psychology without the rational actor model is a seriously crippled enterprise. This conclusion holds for social psychology as well. For examples of socio-psychological analyses based on behavioral economics principles, see Keiser et al. (2008) , Stapel and Lindenberg (2011) and references therein.
However, the rational actor model has an obvious shortcoming that must be dealt with before the model can fit harmoniously with a sophisticated cognitive psychology of human decision-making. The rational actor model describes how individuals make decisions in social isolation, using an agent's "subjective prior" to represent his beliefs as to how actions link to real-world outcomes and thence to personal payoffs. Given the social nature of the human brain, however, it is inaccurate to equate subjective priors, which are constituted in social networks, with "beliefs," as the latter become constituted and evolve in social life. Beliefs are the product of social of rational interaction, a fact that undermines the rather naive methodological individualism choice theorists. Thus, rational decision-making inexorably involves imitation, sometimes exhibits conformist bias, and generally entails the constitution of networks of mutual beliefs characteristic of a distributed mind. Harvey Whitehouse's chapter in this book on the instrumental opaqueness of ritualistic activity illustrates rather well the connection between rationality and tradition found in virtually every society that has been studied, as does Likka Pyysiaäinen's chapter in this volume, which argues that analytical treatments of religion are ineluctably reductivist, purportedly "explaining" religion fully in terms of lower-level cognitive and social variables. In fact, religion is an emergent property of human societies, giving meaning to human life that cannot be deduced from more mundane aspects of human social existence and cognitive organization.
Complexity theory is needed because human society is a complex adaptive system with emergent properties that cannot now, and perhaps never will be, explained starting with more basic units of analysis. The hypothetico-deductive methods of game theory and the rational actor model, and even gene-culture coevolutionary theory, must therefore be complemented by the work of behavioral scientists who deal with society in more interpretive terms, and develop holistic schemas that shed light where analytical models cannot penetrate. Anthropological and historical studies fall into this category, as well as macroeconomic policy and comparative economic systems. Agent-based modeling of complex adaptive dynamical systems is also useful in dealing with emergent properties of complex systems (see Ron Son's contribution to this volume, as well as Sun 2006, s008) 2 Gene-Culture Coevolution Because culture is key to the evolutionary success of Homo sapiens, individual fitness in humans depends on the structure of social life. It follows that human cognitive, affective, and moral capacities are the product of an evolutionary dynamic involving the interaction of genes and culture. This dynamic is known as gene-culture coevolution (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1982 , Boyd and Richerson 6 1985 , Dunbar 1993 , Richerson and Boyd 2004 . This coevolutionary process has endowed us with preferences that go beyond the egoistic emphasized in traditional economic and biological theory, and embrace a social epistemology facilitating the sharing of intentionality across minds, as well as such non-self-regarding values as a taste for cooperation, fairness, and retribution, the capacity to empathize, and the ability to value honesty, hard work, piety, toleration of diversity, and loyalty to one's reference group.
The genome encodes information that is used both to construct a new organism and to endow it with instructions for transforming sensory inputs into decision outputs. Because learning is costly and error-prone, efficient information transmission occurs when the genome encodes all aspects of the organism's environment that are constant, or that change only slowly through time and space. By contrast, environmental conditions that vary rapidly or, require a complex series of coordinated actions, can be dealt with by providing the organism with the capacity to learn.
There is an intermediate case, however, that is efficiently handled neither by genetic encoding nor learning. When environmental conditions are positively correlated across generations, each generation acquires valuable information through learning that it cannot transmit genetically to the succeeding generation, because such information is not encoded in the germ line. Indeed, there is no plausible mechanism whereby complex learned behaviors can be incorporated in the genome. Hence, there is a fitness benefit to the transmission of epigenetic information concerning the current state of the environment. Such epigenetic information is quite common in the natural world, (Jablonka and Lamb 1995) , but achieves its highest and most flexible form in cultural transmission in humans and to a consid-erably lesser extent in other primates (Bonner 1984, Richerson and Boyd 1998) .
Cultural transmission takes the form of vertical (parents to children) horizontal (peer to peer), and oblique (elder to younger), as in Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) , prestige (higher influencing lower status), as in Henrich and GilWhite (2001) , popularity-related as in Newman et al. (2006) , and even random population-dynamic transmission, as in Shennan (1997) and Skibo and Bentley (2003) .
The parallel between cultural and biological evolution goes back to Huxley (1955) , Popper (1979) , and James (1880)-see Mesoudi et al. (2006) for details.
The idea of treating culture as a form of epigenetic transmission was pioneered by Richard Dawkins, who coined the term "meme" in The Selfish Gene (1976) to represent an integral unit of information that could be transmitted phenotypically. There quickly followed several major contributions to a biological approach to culture, all based on the notion that culture, like genes, could evolve through replication (intergenerational transmission), mutation, and selection.
Cultural elements reproduce themselves from brain to brain and across time, mutate, and are subject to selection according to their effects on the fitness of their carriers (Parsons 1964, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1982) . Moreover, there are strong interactions between genetic and epigenetic elements in human evolution, ranging from basic physiology (e.g., the transformation of the organs of speech with the evolution of language) to sophisticated social emotions, including empathy, shame, guilt, and revenge-seeking (Zajonc 1980 , Krajbich et al. 2009 ).
Because of their common informational and evolutionary character, there are strong parallels between genetic and cultural modeling (Mesoudi et al. 2006) . Like biological transmission, culture is transmitted from parents to offspring, and like 8 cultural transmission, which is transmitted horizontally to unrelated individuals, so in microbes and many plant species, genes are regularly transferred across lineage boundaries (Jablonka and Lamb 1995 , Rivera and Lake 2004 , Abbott et al. 2003 . Moreover, anthropologists reconstruct the history of social groups by analyzing homologous and analogous cultural traits, much as biologists reconstruct the evolution of species by the analysis of shared characters and homologous DNA (Mace and Pagel 1994) . Indeed, the same computer programs developed by biological systematists are used by cultural anthropologists (Holden 2002, Holden and Mace 2003) . In addition, archeologists who study cultural evolution have a similar modus operandi as paleobiologists who study genetic evolution (Mesoudi et al. 2006) . Both attempt to reconstruct lineages of artifacts and their carriers. Like paleobiology, archaeology assumes that when analogy can be ruled out, Like biogeography's study of the spatial distribution of organisms (Brown and Lomolino 1998) , behavioral ecology studies the interaction of ecological, historical, and geographical factors that determine distribution of cultural forms across space and time (Smith and Winterhalder 1992 ).
Dawkins added a fundamental mechanism of epigenetic information transmission in The Extended Phenotype (1982) , noting that organisms can directly transmit environmental artifacts to the next generation, in the form of such constructs as beaver dams, bee hives, and even social structures (e.g., mating and hunting practices). The phenomenon of a species creating an important aspect of its en- An excellent example of gene-environment coevolution is the honey bee, in which the origin of its eusociality likely lay in the high degree of relatedness fostered by haplodiploidy, but which persists in modern species despite the fact that relatedness in the hive is generally quite low, due to multiple queen matings, multiple queens, queen deaths, and the like (Gadagkar 1991 , Seeley 1997 , Wilson and Holldobler 2005 . The social structure of the hive is transmitted epigenetically across generations, and the honey bee genome is an adaptation to the social structure laid down in the distant past.
Gene-culture coevolution in humans is a special case of gene-environment coevolution in which the environment is culturally constituted and transmitted (Feldman and Zhivotovsky 1992) . The key to the success of our species in the framework of the hunter-gatherer social structure in which we evolved is the capacity of unrelated, or only loosely related, individuals to cooperate in relatively large egalitarian groups in hunting and territorial acquisition and defense (Boehm 2000, Richerson and Boyd 2004) . While contemporary biological and economic theory have attempted to show that such cooperation can be effected by self-regarding rational agents (Trivers 1971 , Alexander 1987 , Fudenberg et al. 1994 , the conditions under which this is the case are highly implausible even for small groups (Boyd and Richerson 1988 , Gintis 2005 , Bowles and Gintis 2011 . Rather, the social environment of early humans was conducive to the development of prosocial traits, such as empathy, shame, pride, embarrassment, and reciprocity, without which social cooperation would be impossible.
Neuroscientific studies exhibit clearly the genetically-based neural structures that are specialized to support moral cognition and action. Brain regions involved in moral judgments and behavior include the prefrontal cortex, especially the orbitalfrontal cortex, and the superior temporal sulcus (Moll et al. 2005) . These brain structures are most highly developed in humans and are doubtless evolutionary adaptations (Schulkin 2000) . The evolution of the human prefrontal cortex is closely tied to the emergence of human morality (Allman et al. 2002) . Patients of with focal damage to one or more of these areas exhibit a variety of antisocial behaviors, including the absence embarrassment, pride and regret (Beer et al. 2003 , Camille 2004 , and sociopathic behavior (Miller et al. 1997 ). There is a likely genetic predisposition underlying sociopathy, and sociopaths comprise 3-4% of the male population, but they account for between 33% and 80% of the population of chronic criminal offenders in the United States (Mednick et al. 1977 ).
We shall argue on the basis of this body of empirical information that culture is directly encoded into the human brain and achieves its force by virtue of the intimate cognitive interaction of socially distributed mind, which of course is the central claim of gene-culture coevolutionary theory.
The evolution of the physiology of speech and facial communication is a dramatic example of gene-culture coevolution. The increased social importance of communication in human society rewarded genetic changes that facilitate speech.
Regions in the motor cortex expanded in early humans to facilitate speech production. Concurrently, nerves and muscles to the mouth, larynx, and tongue became more numerous to handle the complexities of speech (Jurmain et al. 1997 ). Parts of the cerebral cortex, Broca's and Wernicke's areas, which do not exist or are rela-tively small in other primates, are large in humans and permit grammatical speech and comprehension (Binder et al. 1997 , Belin et al. 2000 .
Adult modern humans have a larynx low in the throat, a position that allows the throat to serve as a resonating chamber capable of a great number of sounds (Relethford 2007) . The first hominids that have skeletal structures supporting this laryngeal placement are the Homo heidelbergensis, who lived from 800,000 to 100,000 years ago. In addition, the production of consonants requires a short oral cavity, whereas our nearest primate relatives have much too long an oral cavity for this purpose. The position of the hyoid bone, which is a point of attachment for a tongue muscle, developed in Homo sapiens in a manner permitting highly precise and flexible tongue movements.
Another indication that the tongue has evolved in hominids to facilitate speech is the size of the hypoglossal canal, an aperture that permits the hypoglossal nerve to reach the tongue muscles. This aperture is much larger in Neanderthals and humans than in early hominids and non-human primates (Dunbar 1996) . Human facial nerves and musculature have also evolved to facilitate communication. This musculature is present in all vertebrates, but except in mammals, it serves feeding and respiratory functions alone (Burrows 2008) . In mammals, this mimetic musculature attaches to the skin of the face, thus permitting the facial communication of such emotions as fear, surprise, disgust, and anger. In most mammals, however, a few wide sheet-like muscles are involved, rendering fine information differentiation impossible, whereas in primates, this musculature divides into many independent muscles with distinct points of attachment to the epidermis, thus permitting higher bandwidth facial communication. Humans have the most highly developed facial musculature by far of any primate species, with a degree of involvement of lips and eyes that is not present in any other species. This example is quite a dramatic and concrete illustration of the intimate interaction of genes and culture in the evolution of our species.
Rational Decision Theory
General evolutionary principles suggest that individual decision making for members of a species can be modeled as optimizing a preference function. Natural selection leads the content of preferences to reflect biological fitness. The principle of expected utility extends this optimization to stochastic outcomes. The resulting model is called the rational actor model or rational decision theory in economics.
For every constellation of sensory inputs, each decision taken by an organism generates a probability distribution over outcomes, the expected value of which is the fitness associated with that decision. Since fitness is a scalar variable, for each constellation of sensory inputs, each possible action the organism might take has a specific fitness value, and organisms whose decision mechanisms are optimized for this environment will choose the available action that maximizes this value. This argument was presented verbally by Darwin (1872) and is implicit in the standard notion of "survival of the fittest," but formal proof is recent (Grafen 1999 (Grafen , 2000 (Grafen , 2002 . The case with frequency-dependent (non-additive genetic) fitness has yet to be formally demonstrated, but the informal arguments are compelling.
Given the state of its sensory inputs, if an orgasm with an optimized brain chooses action A over action B when both are available, and chooses action B over action C when both are available, then it will also choose action A over action C when both are available. Thus choice consistency follows from basic evolutionary 13 dynamics.
The so-called rational actor model was developed in the Twentieth century by John von Neumann, Leonard Savage and many others. The model is often presented as though it applies only when actors possess extremely strong information processing capacities. In fact, the model depends only on choice consistency (Gintis 2009a) . When preferences are consistent, they can be represented by a numerical function, often called a utility function, which the individual maximizes subject to his subjective beliefs. When consistency extends over lotteries (actions with probabilistic outcomes), then agents act as though they were maximizing expected utility subject to their subjective priors (beliefs concerning the effect of actions on the probability of diverse outcomes).
Four caveats are in order. First, individuals do not consciously maximize something called "utility," or anything else. Rather, consistent preferences imply that there is an objective function such that the individual's choices can be predicted by maximizing the expected value of the objective function (much as a physical system can be understood by solving a set of Hamiltonian equations, with no implication that physical systems carry out such a set of mathematical operations). Second, individual choices, even if they are self-regarding (e.g., personal consumption) are not necessarily welfare-enhancing. For instance, a rational decision-maker may smoke cigarettes knowing full well their harmful effects, and even wishing that he preferred not to smoke cigarettes. It is fully possible for a rational decisionmaker to wish that he had preferences other than those he actually has, and even to transform his preferences accordingly. Third, preferences must have some stability across time to be theoretically useful, but preferences are ineluctably a function of an individual's current state, which includes both his physiological state and his 14 current beliefs. Because beliefs can change dramatically and rapidly in response to sensory experience, preferences may be subject to discontinuous change. Finally, beliefs need not be correct nor need they be updated correctly in the face of new evidence, although Bayesian assumptions concerning updating can be made part of consistency in elegant and compelling ways (Jaynes 2003) .
The rational actor model is the cornerstone of contemporary economic theory, and in the past few decades has become the heart of the biological modeling of animal behavior (Real 1991 , Alcock 1993 , Real and Caraco 1986 ). Economic and biological theory thus have a natural affinity: the choice consistency on which the rational actor model of economic theory depends is rendered plausible by evolutionary theory, and the optimization techniques pioneered in economics are routinely applied and extended by biologists in modeling the behavior of nonhuman organisms.
In a stochastic environment, natural selection will ensure that the brain make choices that, at least roughly, maximize expected fitness, and hence satisfy the expected utility principle Cooper (1987) . To see this, suppose an organism must choose from action set X , where each x 2 X determines a lottery that pays i offspring with probability p i .x/, for i D 0; 1; : : : ; n. Then the expected number of offspring from this lottery is .x/ D P n j D1 jp j .x/. Let L be a lottery on X that delivers x i 2 X with probability q i for i D 1; : : : ; k. The probability of j offspring given L is then
which is the expected value theorem with utility function . /.
Evidence from contemporary neuroscience suggests that expected utility maximization is not simply an "as if" story. In fact, the brain's neural circuitry actually makes choices by internally representing the payoffs of various alternatives as neural firing rates, and choosing a maximal such rate Schall and Thompson 1999, Glimcher 2003) . Indeed, when animals are tested in a repeated trial setting with variable reward, dopamine neurons appear to encode the difference between the reward that an animal expected to receive and the reward that an animal actually received on a particular trial (Schultz et al. 1997, Sutton and Barto 2000) , an evaluation mechanism that enhances the environmental sensitivity of the animal's decision making system. This error-prediction mechanism has the drawback of only seeking local optima (Sugrue et al. 2005 ).
Montague and Berns (2002) and Niv and Montague (2009) , have shown, however, that often error-prediction algorithms locate global optima. Montague and Berns (2002) , for instance, show that the obitofrontal cortex and striatum contain mechanisms for global predictions that include the making assessment of risk and the discounting of future rewards. Their data suggest a decision model analogous to the famous Black-Scholes options pricing equation (Black and Scholes 1973) .
Perhaps the most pervasive critique of the rational decision model is that put forward by Herbert Simon (1982) , holding that because information processing is costly and humans have finite information processing capacity, individuals satisfice rather than maximize, and hence are only boundedly rational. There is much substance to Simon's premises, especially that of including information processing costs and limited information in modeling choice behavior, and that of recognizing that the decision on how much information to collect depends on unanalyzed subjective priors at some level (Winter 1971 , Heiner 1983 . Indeed, from basic information theory and quantum mechanics it follows that all rationality is bounded.
However, the popular message taken from Simon's work is that we should reject the rational actor model. For instance, the mathematical psychologist D. H. Krantz (1991) asserts, "The normative assumption that individuals should maximize some quantity may be wrong. . . People do and should act as problem solvers, not maximizers." This is incorrect. In fact, as long as individuals are involved in routine choice and hence have consistent preferences, they can be modeled as maximizing an objective function subject to constraints. This point is lost on even such capable researchers as Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) , who reject the "optimization subject to constraints" method on the grounds that individuals do not in fact solve optimization problems. However, just as the billiards players do not solve differential equations in choosing their shots, so decision-makers do not solve Lagrangian equations, even though in both cases we may use such optimization models to describe their behavior.
From Rational Action to Bayesian Cognition
Bayesian models of cognitive inference that generalize the rational actor model are increasingly prominent is several areas of cognitive psychology, including animal and human learning (Courville et al. 2006 , Tenenbaum et al. 2006 , Steyvers et al. 2003 , Griffiths and Tenenbaum 2008 , visual perception and motor control (Yuille and Kersten 1006, Kording and Wolpert 2006) ,semantic memory and language processing (Steyvers et al. 2006, Chater and Manning 2006, Xu and press), and social cognition (Baker et al. 2007 ). For a recent overview of Bayesian models of cognition, see Griffiths et al. (2008) . These models are especially satisfying because they bridge the gap between traditional cognitive models that stress symbolic representations and their equally traditional adversaries that stress statistical testing. Bayesian models are symbolic in that they are predicated upon a repertoire of pre-existing models that can be tested, as well as statistical techniques that carry out the testing and provide the feedback through which the underlying models can be chosen and modified.
Bayesian information processing models may solve the problem of how humans acquire complex understandings of the world given severely underdetermining data. For instance, the spectrum of light waves received in the eye depends both on the color spectrum of the object being observed and the way the object is illuminated. Therefore inferring the object's color is severely underdetermined, yet we manage to consider most objects to have constant color even as the background illumination changes. Brainard and Freeman (1997) show that a Bayesian model solves this problem fairly well, given reasonable subjective priors as to the object's color and the effects of the illuminating spectra on the object's surface.
Several students of developmental learning have stressed that children's learning is to similar to scientific hypothesis testing (Carey 1985, Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997) , but without offering specific suggestions as the calculation mechanisms involved. Recent studies suggest that these mechanisms include causal Bayesian networks and related algorithmic processes (Glymour 2001 , Gopnik and Schultz 2007 , Gopnik and Tenenbaum 2007 , Sun 2008 . One schema, known as constraint- hjx; T / D P.xjh; T /P.hjT /
Here, P.xjh; T / is the likelihood of the observed data x, given h and the background theory T , and P.
hjT / gives the likelihood of h in the agent's repertoire
T . The constitution of T is an area of active research. In language acquisition, it will include predispositions to recognize certain forms as grammatical and not others. In other cases, T might include different models of folk-physics, folk-biology, or natural theology. Recent theoretical work in cognitive neuroscience has shown how neural networks could implement Bayesian inference (Ma et al. 2006 ).
5 Evolutionary Game Theory
The analysis of living systems includes one concept that is not analytically represented in the natural sciences: that of a strategic interaction, in which the behavior of agents is derived by assuming that each is choosing a best response to the actions of other agents. The study of systems in which agents choose best responses and in which such responses evolve dynamically, is called evolutionary game theory.
A replicator is a physical system capable of drawing energy and chemical building blocks from its environment to make copies of itself. Chemical crystals, such as salt, have this property, but biological replicators have the additional ability to assume a myriad of physical forms based on the highly variable sequencing of its chemical building blocks. Biology studies the dynamics of such complex replicators using the evolutionary concepts of replication, variation, mutation, and selection (Lewontin 1974 ).
Biology plays a role in the behavioral sciences much like that of physics in the natural sciences. Just as physics studies the elementary processes that underlie all natural systems, so biology studies the general characteristics of survivors of the process of natural selection. In particular, genetic replicators, the epigenetic environments to which they give rise, and the effect of these environments on gene frequencies, account for the characteristics of species, including the development of individual traits and the nature of intraspecific interaction. This does not mean, of course, that behavioral science in any sense reduces to biological laws. Just as one cannot deduce the character of natural systems (e.g., the principles of inorganic and organic chemistry, the structure and history of the universe, robotics, plate tectonics) from the basic laws of physics, similarly one cannot deduce the structure 20 and dynamics of complex life forms from basic biological principles. But, just as physical principles inform model creation in the natural sciences, so must biological principles inform all the behavioral sciences.
Within population biology, evolutionary game theory has become a fundamental tool. Indeed, evolutionary game theory is basically population biology with frequency dependent fitnesses. Throughout much of the Twentieth century, classical population biology did not employ a game-theoretic framework (Fisher 1930 , Haldane 1932 , Wright 1931 . However, Moran (1964) showed that Fisher's Fundamental Theorem, which states that as long as there is positive genetic variance in a population, fitness increases over time, is false when more than one genetic locus is involved. Eshel and Feldman (1984) identified the problem with the population genetic model in its abstraction from mutation. But how do we attach a fitness value to a mutant? Eshel and Feldman (1984) suggested that payoffs be modeled game-theoretically on the phenotypic level, and a mutant gene be associated with a strategy in the resulting game. With this assumption, they showed that under some restrictive conditions, Fisher's Fundamental Theorem could be restored. Their results were generalized by Liberman (1988) , Hammerstein and Selten (1994) , Hammerstein (1996) , Eshel et al. (1998) and others.
The most natural setting for genetic and cultural dynamics is game theoretic.
Replicators (genetic and/or cultural) endow copies of themselves with a repertoire of strategic responses to environmental conditions, including information concerning the conditions under which each is to be deployed in response to the character and density of competing replicators. Genetic replicators have been well understood since the rediscovery of Mendel's laws in the early 20th century.
Cultural transmission also apparently occurs at the neuronal level in the brain, in part through the action of mirror neurons (Williams et al. 2001 , Rizzolatti et al. 2002 , Meltzhoff and Decety 2003 . Mutations include replacement of strategies by modified strategies, and the "survival of the fittest" dynamic (formally called a replicator dynamic) ensures that replicators with more successful strategies replace those with less successful (Taylor and Jonker 1978) .
Cultural dynamics, however, do not reduce to replicator dynamics. For one thing, the process of switching from lower-to higher-payoff cultural norms is subject to error, and with some positive frequency, lower-payoff forms can displace higher-payoff forms (Edgerton 1992) . Moreover, cultural evolution can involve conformist bias (Henrich and Boyd 1998 , Henrich and Boyd 2001 , Guzman et al. 2007 , as well as oblique and horizontal transmission (Lumsden and Wilson 1981 , Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981 , Gintis 2003 .
In rational choice theory, choices give rise to probability distributions over outcomes, the expected values of which are the payoffs to the choice from which they arose. Game theory extends this analysis to cases where there are multiple decision makers. In the language of game theory, players (or agents) are endowed with a set of available strategies, and have certain information concerning the rules of the game, the nature of the other players and their available strategies, as well as the structure of payoffs. Finally, for each combination of strategy choices by the players, the game specifies a distribution of payoffs to the players. Game theory predicts the behavior of the players by assuming each maximizes its preference function subject to its information, beliefs, and constraints (Kreps 1990 ).
Game theory is a logical extension of evolutionary theory. To see this, suppose there is only one replicator, deriving its nutrients and energy from non-living sources. The replicator population will then grow at a geometric rate, until it 22 presses upon its environmental inputs. At that point, mutants that exploit the environment more efficiently will out-compete their less efficient conspecifics, and with input scarcity, mutants will emerge that "steal" from conspecifics who have amassed valuable resources. With the rapid growth of such predators, mutant prey will devise means of avoiding predation, and predators will counter with their own novel predatory capacities. In this manner, strategic interaction is born from elemental evolutionary forces. It is only a conceptual short step from this point to cooperation and competition among cells in a multi-cellular body, among conspecifics who cooperate in social production, between males and females in a sexual species, between parents and offspring, and among groups competing for territorial control.
Historically, game theory did not emerge from biological considerations, but rather from strategic concerns in World War II (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Poundstone 1992) . This led to the widespread caricature of game theory as applicable only to static confrontations of rational self-regarding agents possessed of formidable reasoning and information processing capacity. Developments within game theory in recent years, however, render this caricature inaccurate.
Game theory has become the basic framework for modeling animal behavior (Maynard Smith 1982 , Alcock 1993 , Krebs and Davies 1997 , and thus has shed its static and hyperrationalistic character, in the form of evolutionary game theory (Gintis 2009b) . Evolutionary and behavioral game theory do not require the formidable information processing capacities of classical game theory, so disciplines that recognize that cognition is scarce and costly can make use of gametheoretic models (Young 1998 , Gintis 2009b , Gigerenzer and Selten 2001 . Thus, 23 agents may consider only a restricted subset of strategies (Winter 1971 , Simon 1972 , and they may use by rule-of-thumb heuristics rather than maximization techniques (Gigerenzer and Selten 2001) . Game theory is thus a generalized schema that permits the precise framing of meaningful empirical assertions, but imposes no particular structure on the predicted behavior.
6 Socio-psychological Theory of Norms
Complex social systems generally have a division of labor, with distinct social positions occupied by individuals specially prepared for their roles. For instance, a bee hive has workers, drones, queens, and workers can be nurses, foragers, or scouts.
Preparation for roles is by gender and larval nutrition. Modern human society has a division of labor characterized by dozens of specialized roles, appropriate behavior within which is given by social norms, and individuals are actors who are motivated to fulfill these roles through a combination of material incentives and normative commitments.
The centrality of culture in the social division of labor was clearly expressed by Emile Durkheim (1933 Durkheim ( [1902 ), who stressed that the great multiplicity of roles (which he called organic solidarity) required a commonality of beliefs (which he called collective consciousness) that would permit the smooth coordination of actions by distinct individuals. This theme was developed by Talcott Parsons (1937) , who used his knowledge of economics to articulate a sophisticated model of the interaction between the situation (role) and its inhabitant (actor). The actor/role approach to social norms was filled out by Erving Goffman (1959) , among others.
The social role has both normative and positive aspects. On the positive side, 24 the payoffs-rewards and penalties-associated with a social role must provide the appropriate incentives for actors to carry out the duties associated with the role. This requirement is most easily satisfied when these payoffs are independent from the behavior of agents occupying other roles. However, this is rarely the case. In general, social roles are deeply interdependent, and can be modeled as the strategy sets of players in an epistemic game, the payoffs to which are precisely these rewards and penalties, the choices of actors then forming a correlated equilibrium, for which the required commonality of beliefs is provided by a society's common culture (Gintis 2009a) . This argument provides an analytical link uniting the actor/role framework in sociological theory with game theoretic models of cooperation in economic theory.
Appropriate behavior in a social role is given by a social norm that specifies the duties, privileges, and normal behavior associated with the role. In the first instance, the complex of social norms has a instrumental character devoid of normative content, serving merely as an informational device that coordinates the behavior of rational agents (Lewis 1969 , Gauthier 1986 , Binmore 2005 , Bicchieri 2006 ). However, in most cases, high level performance in a social role requires that the actor have a personal commitment to role performance that cannot be captured by the self-regarding "public" payoffs associated with the role (Conte and Castelfranchi 1999, Gintis 2009a) . This is because (a) actors may have private payoffs that conflict with the public payoffs, inducing them to behave counter to proper role-performance (e.g., corruption, favoritism, aversion to specific tasks); (b) the signal used to determine the public payoffs may be inaccurate and unreliable (e.g., the performance of a teacher or physician); and (c) the public payoffs required to gain compliance by self-regarding actors may be higher than those re-quired when there is at least partial reliance upon the personal commitment of role incumbents (e.g., it may be less costly to use personally committed rather than purely materially motivated physicians and teachers). In such cases, self-regarding actors who treat social norms purely instrumentally will behave in a socially inefficient manner. This point is stressed in Peter Bull and Ofer Feldman's chapter in this book, in their discussion of the social skills model of political discourse.
The normative aspect of social roles flows from these considerations. First, to the extent that social roles are considered legitimate by incumbents, they will place an intrinsic positive ethical value on role-performance. We may call this the normative bias associated with role-occupancy (Gintis 2009a) . This phenomenon has strong support in the cognitive neuroscience literature. For instance, social norms appear to affect the same neural regions as those involved in reward learning and valuation (Klucharev et al. 2009) , showing that morality is not a constraint on behavior, but rather a positive motivator of behavior. Second, human ethical predispositions include character virtues, such as honesty, trustworthiness, promisekeeping, and obedience, that may increase the value of conforming to the duties associated with role-incumbency (Gneezy 2005) . Third, humans are also predisposed to care about the esteem of others even when there can be no future reputational repercussions (Masclet et al. 2003) , and take pleasure in punishing others who have violated social norms (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) . These normative traits by no means contradict rationality (section 3), because individuals trade off these values against material reward, and against each other, just as described in the economic theory of the rational actor (Andreoni and Miller 2002, Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) .
The socio-psychological model of norms can thus resolve the contradictions between the sociological and economic approaches to social cooperation, retaining the analytical clarity of game theory and the rational actor model, while incorporating the normative and cultural considerations stressed in psycho-social models of norm compliance.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented five analytical tools that together help adjudicate the conflicting disciplinary models of human action in the behavioral disciplines, with an emphasis on the role of cognitive processes in weaving social principles in to a between coherent conceptual web. While there are doubtless formidable scientific issues involved in providing the precise articulations these tools and the major conceptual tools of the various disciplines, these scientific issues are likely to be dwarfed by the sociological issues surrounding the semi-feudal nature of modern the behavioral disciplines.
